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Abstract
This paper examines how US and proposed international law relate to the re-
covery of archaeological data from historic shipwrecks. It argues that US federal
admiralty law of salvage gives far less protection to historic submerged sites than
do US laws protecting archaeological sites on US federal and Indian lands. The
paper offers a simple model in which the net present value of the salvage and ar-
chaeological investigation of an historic shipwreck is maximized. It is suggested
that salvage law gives insufficient protection to archaeological data, but that UN-
ESCO’s Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage goes
too far in the other direction. It is also suggested that a move towards maximizing
the net present value of a wreck would be promoted if the US admiralty courts
explicitly tied the size of salvage awards to the quality of the archaeology per-
formed.
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HISTORIC SHIPWRECKS1 
 
This paper examines how US and proposed international law relate to the 
recovery of archaeological data from historic shipwrecks. It argues that US 
federal admiralty law of salvage gives far less protection to historic submerged 
sites than do US laws protecting archaeological sites on US federal and Indian 
lands. The paper offers a simple model in which the net present value of the 
salvage and archaeological investigation of an historic shipwreck is maximized. It 
is suggested that salvage law gives insufficient protection to archaeological data, 
but that UNESCO's Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural 
Heritage goes too far in the other direction. It is also suggested that a move 
towards maximizing the net present value of a wreck would be promoted if the 
US admiralty courts explicitly tied the size of salvage awards to the quality of the 
archaeology performed. 
 
The excavation of shipwrecks in US waters is a matter of hot dispute between 
archaeologists - who value wrecks largely for the historical archaeological records that 
they might yield - and salvagers, who seek to extract their monetary values. 
Unfortunately, absent a theory of the valuation of wrecks it is difficult to make 
judgements about the rationality of US law as it relates to them. Working on the 
presumption that the law of property should properly aim to maximize the value of a 
property, laws governing shipwrecks should at least attempt to take into consideration the 
economic value - as opposed to the monetary value - of wrecks. It is acknowledged that 
there is some evidence that US admiralty law courts are aware of the distinction between 
salvage value and archaeological value. However, it is argued here that they have not yet 
devised a suitable standard either for encouraging the collection of archaeological data by 
bona fide professional archaeologists, or, for maximizing the total economic value of a 
wreck. 
 
                                                          
1 I would like to thank Dr. Toni Carrel for helpful her comments. 
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Also disputed by salvagers and the underwater archaeological profession is the rationality 
of UNESCO's Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage. If 
ratified and accepted by the US (which at this time appears to be unlikely), would replace 
admiralty law outside of US territorial waters. With this prospective international law, the 
positions of the salvagers and the archaeologists are reversed. It is the salvagers who 
complain about the Protocol's intent of seemingly maximizing archaeological value 
(under the rubric of 'protecting the common heritage of mankind'), but at the expense of 
salvage value. 
 
It is the purpose here to examine the economic rationality of both US admiralty law and 
UNESCO's Protocol. To do this in section 1 a simple economic model is constructed that 
indicates how in principle the economic value of a shipwreck can be maximized. In 
section 2 relevant aspects of US law as it relates to archaeology is briefly reviewed. In 
section 3 US admiralty law is confronted with this economic model. The conclusion is 
drawn that it is likely that the admiralty courts have not yet done enough to encourage the 
collection of highest quality archaeological data nor, therefore, to maximize the economic 
value of shipwrecks in US waters. In section 4 UNESCO's Protocol is subjected to 
similar scrutiny. It is suggested that perhaps the Protocol goes too far in the other 
direction. That is, of over-protecting archaeological value at the expense of salvage value. 
 
1: The economic values of shipwrecks 
Shipwrecks in general supply various kinds of economic values. These are, first, salvage 
value - as when cargoes of high monetary value are recovered, so returning them to the 
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'stream of commerce'. Secondly, archaeological value - as when the careful investigation 
of a wreck uncovers interesting historical information. Thirdly, Recreation value - as for 
hobbyist divers. Finally, reef value - as when a wreck creates an artificial reef as a habitat 
for fish that may be of value to recreational anglers. 
 
Of most interest to us are salvage and archaeological values. There are five main reasons 
for narrowing the focus in this way. First, because these two values will often be the 
largest of the four values; secondly, individual wrecks will quite frequently combine 
them; thirdly, there is a tradeoff between them in the sense that maximizing salvage value 
may minimize archaeological value. Fourthly, recreation value may be enjoyed even after 
the forgoing values have been extracted. Finally, as it is becoming a common practice to 
deliberately sink hulks to create artificial reefs, reef value is perhaps best left to a 
discussion separate from that of old wrecks. 
 
As there are a finite number of shipwrecks - perhaps about 50,000 off the US coast, and 
one million worldwide  - they are a depleteable (non-natural) resource in the sense that 
salvage removes them from the stock of wrecks still available for exploitation. However, 
shipwrecks are not an open access resource as they are governed by state and federal 
admiralty law. Moreover, salvage rights over historic wrecks, such as the Titanic, lying 
under the high seas may be established through the courts of a nearby country - the USA 
in the case of the Titanic. In addition, ratification of UNESCO's Protocol would create an 
international law over wrecks. 
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There are four characteristics of salvage and archaeological value that are of interest. 
First, salvage creates a monetary value. That is, when the salvaged goods are sold they 
create a flow of revenue to the salvage company. A salvage company is assumed to aim 
to maximize the net present value of profits derivable from the salvage of a wreck - 
where NPV = PVbenefit - PVcost.   
 
Secondly, archaeological value is measured as the utility of the knowledge gathered 
through careful archaeological work. However, it is assumed that a money value can be 
placed on the utility of new knowledge. Admittedly, in practice this is a difficult, but it is 
in fact done on a routine basis. For example, governments have to decide how much to 
spend supporting pure research in state universities. Similarly with private sector 
companies performing pure research in, for example, pharmaceuticals. One attempt to 
place a value on archaeological knowledge is that of Throckmorton (1990) who measured 
value using the measured increase in visitors to a museum in, Kyrenia, Cyprus, after the 
artifacts and archaeological records of a 4th century BC ship had been placed there for 
public inspection. More generally, the monetary value of utility is measured in terms of 
what somebody is willing to pay (WTP) for the thing that offers that level of utility - 
what a museum is WTP for archaeological records and artifacts, or a TV station for the 
filmed record of a dive. As archaeological knowledge once collected continues to exist 
through time, it has a present value, and after deducting the present value of the costs of 
collection, a NPV.   
 
We can write: 
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Total net present value of a wreck = Salvage value + Archaeological value   
Or, 
TNPV = NPVsalvage   +    NPVarchaeology              (1) 
Thirdly, it is assumed that pure salvage operations (i.e. operations unencumbered by the 
collection of archaeological data) can occur rapidly so that stretching out the period of 
time over which salvage occurs reduces the NPVsalvage. 
 
The final assumption is that recovery of archaeological data and artifacts is time 
consuming. Opinion among practitioners is that fourteen days would be an unusually 
long time for pure salvage operations over a wreck. However, the thorough collection of 
archaeological knowledge is far more time consuming - for example, about 300 dive days 
where spent over the wreck of the La Salle off the coast of Texas in 199X. Clearly, 
increased time diving over a wreck is required if more data is to be collected. We will 
assume that present value and NPV of archaeological knowledge increases with time 
spent over a wreck - at least for a period much more prolonged than is needed for 
salvage. Relevant to the length of this period of time is for how many days the value of 
the knowledge collected exceeds the (marginal) cost of collection. When this falls to zero 
it is time to end an investigation.  
 
Collecting economic value 
As archaeological value is expensive to collect and difficult to monetize salvage 
companies will not want to collect it.  Sometimes salvagers claim that they do keep 
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archaeological records, possibly because by showing themselves before the courts as 
responsible citizens they hope to obtain larger salvage rewards.  However, the value of 
'archaeological records' collected by salvagers has been questioned on the grounds that 
their findings are insufficient to appear in peer reviewed archaeology journals.  Siding 
with latter view it is assumed that salvage companies will have little interest in 
maximizing equation 1.2 
 
The objective of a society is assumed to be to maximize the TNPV of a wreck, where net 
present value is defined in equation 1. To illustrate the maximization problem, observe 
the two NPV functions - both as a function of time -  drawn in figure 1. The negative 
sloped function is marked PVsalvage showing how delay affects the profits of salvage 
companies. The other function is marked  PVarchaeology . This is positively sloped 
indicating - as argued above - that the NPV of archaeological work increases with the 
time spent over a wreck. Adding these two NPV functions together yields the TNPV. 
This function has a humped-back shape that turns out to be of special importance. We 
will return to discuss this in a moment. 
 
Before doing so it should be emphasized that the TNPV function may take on two other 
shapes of a general characteristic. First, when a wreck has high salvage value but low 
archaeological value the TNPV function may be negatively sloped throughout. See figure 
2. This is the case where TNPV is maximized by a rapid salvage operation that may 
                                                          
2 There is a parallel between salvage companies and oil companies. When oil companies 
produce oil from a well they also produce some gas. When the value of the gas is large 
enough to monetize, oil companies collect the gas and sell it. However, when they cannot 
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collect little or no archaeological data. For example, the wreck may be of a world war one 
vintage war ship containing many crates of high quality champagne worth $2,000 per 
bottle at auction; but with little archaeological value because all or most that there is to 
know about this particular ship is already known. 
 
At the other extreme is a wreck that is of high archaeological value - perhaps because it 
can add a lot to a sketchily known period of history - such as might be revealed by the 
wrecks of ancient Greek or Egyptian crafts. Alternatively, the wrecks of US Civil War 
war ships might be of high archaeological value because the recovery of even small 
details makes more vivid the history of a particularly interesting period of history. While 
artifacts recovered from wrecks such as these might also have a high salvage value, 
assuming that archaeological value dominates, the TNPV function may be positively 
sloped throughout. Such a function favors a drawn-out archaeological dive with salvage 
companies being kept away.  
 
However, as figure 1 illustrates, the TNPV function may be neither negatively nor 
positively sloped throughout its length. As such, it is not clear whether the salvagers or 
the archaeologists should have it. In fact, in figure 1, TNPV is maximized at D1 dive-
days, yielding NPV1salvage  and    NPV1archaeology. In other words, salvage and archaeology 
should share the wreck. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
monetize the value of the gas they flare it off and it goes to waste. Similarly with salvage 
companies - unless they can monetize archaeological value they flare it off.  
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The relevance of the choice of discount rate to the NPV and TNPV function is worth 
considering. A high discount rate reduces the present value of expected future benefits 
compared with a low discount rate. Thus, high discount rates discriminate in favor of 
projects with quick payback periods. A high discount rate therefore would tend to favor 
salvage over archaeological value. This is because salvage value can be realized quite 
quickly (when and if the goods are put up for auction); and though archaeological value 
may not deplete over time, the present values of future years will be heavily discounted. 
 
The effect of a high discount rate is then to tilt the TNPV to slope negatively, so favoring 
salvage over archaeology. The opposite is the case with a low discount rate. The TNPV 
function may be tilted to slope positively, so favoring archaeology over salvage. 
 
The discount rate aside, how does US law discriminate between salvage and 
archaeological value? The answer depends in large part upon whether an archaeological 
site is on dry or submerged lands. 
 
2: Archaeology and the Law 
Archaeological resources on US federal lands, including submerged lands, are by no 
means treated equally under US law. Land-based sites are granted much the greater 
protection through quite recently passed laws than are historic shipwrecks - which still 
are largely governed by the ancient law of salvage.   
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Thus, US law as expressed in the Archaeological Resources Protection Act (1979, 
amended 1988) gives extensive protection to archaeological sites found on land. The Act 
states that "archaeological resources on public lands and Indian lands are an accessible 
and irreplaceable part of the Nation's heritage", but that "these resources are increasingly 
endangered because of their commercial attractiveness". Moreover, "existing Federal 
laws do not provide adequate protection to prevent the loss and destruction of these 
archaeological resources and sites resulting from uncontrolled excavations and pillage". 
Thus, "the purpose of the Act is to secure, for the present and future benefit of the 
American people, the protection of archaeological resources and sites which are on public 
lands and Indian lands".  
 
Under the ARPA permits are issued for the investigation of archaeological sites on the 
understanding that intended activity is "undertaken for the purpose of furthering 
archaeological knowledge in the public interest". And that "the archaeological resources 
that are excavated or removed from public lands will remain the property of the United 
States, and such resources and copies of associated archaeological records and data will 
be preserved by a suitable university, museum, or other scientific or educational 
institution". Penalties for violating the Act can be severe. The maximum sentence for a 
first offence being a $10,000 fine and imprisonment for up to one year, and twice these 
amounts for a second offence. The severity of the punishment is related to the 
archaeological and commercial value of the archaeological resources involved and the 
cost of restoration and repair of the site. 
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Which law applies to the establishment of property rights in historic shipwrecks depends 
in large part on the location of the wreck. Relevant laws are salvage law, the law of finds, 
the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act (1972), the Abandoned Shipwreck 
Act (1987), related state legislation implementing the latter Act in state waters, and in 
non-navigable state waters various laws may apply including common law, and state 
statutory or regulatory laws.  However, none of these laws protects archaeological value 
to the extent implied by the ARPA. For example, there is no requirement that artifacts 
will remain the property of the US, or that archaeological records will be preserved by a 
suitable university or museum.   
 
Table 1 lists the jurisdiction of the various laws relating to historic shipwrecks. 
            TABLE 1: US LAWS RELATING TO HISTORIC SHIPWRECKS 
LAW OF SALVAGE STATE AND OTHER LAWS 
1. Federal submerged lands - 3-12 miles 
from the coast 
1. Non-navigable waters. Various laws may 
apply: common, statutory or regulatory. 
2. Outer-continental shelf - 12-200 miles 
from the coast 
2. State submerged lands 0-3 miles from 
the coast. If the wreck is either historic or 
embedded the Abandoned Shipwreck Act2 
applies which divests authority to related 
state laws. 
3. Deep seabed - beyond 200 miles. 
Applies if salvagers choose to claim 
property rights through US courts 
3. In 12 designated marine protected areas 
the Marine Protection, Research and 
Sanctuaries Act applies 
4. State navigable submerged lands - 0-3 
miles from the coast. If the wreck is not 
abandoned - law of salvage. If abandoned, 
law of finds1. 
 
[1] Admiralty courts are reluctant to apply the 
common law of finds to shipwrecks, preferring 
instead to apply salvage law. The reasoning is based 
on interpretation of the word "abandoned". Even a 
shipwreck hundreds of years old is not abandoned 
unless the owner - shipping or insurance company - 
has made an affirmative statement to that effect. 
[2] Following the Brother Jonathan case before the 
Supreme Court in 1998 salvagers are successful in 
having salvage law rather than the ASA applied. 
The Supreme Court had ruled that the 11th 
Amendment protecting states from federal court 
lawsuits did not apply to shipwrecks in state 
navigable submerged lands. 
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Clearly, salvage law predominates in all US navigable waters. However, salvage law was 
initially developed for the purpose of governing the salvaging ships and their cargoes in 
immediate marine peril, and not for the recovery of archaeological knowledge and 
artifacts using modern archaeological methods from historic shipwrecks. Under the law of 
salvage the original owner retains ownership of the goods lost at sea but shares the value 
of recovered goods with the salvager. The salvage award is intended not only to 
compensate the salvager but also to reward 'meritorious services' and to act as an 
inducement to others to perform such services.3 The admiralty courts, in an effort to 
promote the recovery of archaeological data also reward archaeological work done by 
salvagers. However, as is discussed below, professional archaeologists are often highly 
critical of the scientific quality of such work. 
 
The unsuitability of salvage law as it relates to the protection of abandoned historic 
shipwrecks is implicit in the Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987. The Act recognizes the 
multi-use values of historic shipwrecks. Thus, it says, "that shipwrecks offer recreational 
and educational opportunities to sport divers and other interested groups, as well as 
irreplaceable State resources for tourism, biological sanctuaries, and historical research". 
The states are charged with the protection of natural resources and habitat areas, 
guaranteeing recreational exploration of shipwreck sites; and allowing for appropriate 
public and private sector recovery of shipwrecks consistent with the protection of 
historical values and environmental integrity of the shipwrecks and the sites.  
                                                          
3 According to Collins (1999), the size of a salvage award depends upon two factors 
relating to the wreck: the degree of marine peril, the value of property recovered; as well 
as four factors relating to the salvagers: the risks incurred, their promptitude and skill, the 
value of the equipment used, and the amount of labor expended. 
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However, following the Brother Jonathan case in 1998, expert legal opinion is that 
admiralty law of salvage supercedes the ASA. The Supreme Court of the US said that 
states could not use the 11th Amendment for protection against law suits brought in 
relation to salvage law. The effect is that salvagers are able to choose to have their 
salvage rights recognized under federal salvage law rather than the ASA. 
 
The legal demise of the ASA leaves the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries 
Act (1972) as offering most protection to historic shipwrecks. Under the MPRSA it is 
unlawful to cause loss or injure any sanctuary resource, including historic shipwrecks. 
Fines can be substantial, amounting to $100,000 per day for willful misconduct. Such 
misconduct includes violation of archaeological sites. However, the area of jurisdiction of 
this Act is, as its name implies, restricted to just 12 marine sanctuaries which are of 
limited area. 
 
3: Admiralty courts and the protection of archaeological value 
Suppose that there are two types of companies: salvage companies and archaeological 
companies, but that there are relatively few of the latter type. Supposing too that the 
source of value of a wreck can be identified in advance, then it would be natural for 
salvagers and archaeologists to partition the recovery of the value of wrecks according to 
their special competencies. Simply, salvage companies should specialize in shipwrecks 
with high salvage value but low archaeological value, while archaeologists specialize in 
recovering the value of wrecks with the reverse characteristics. 
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However, it is more complicated in the intermediate case illustrated in figure 1. Here both 
types of value contribute to TNPV in somewhat similar proportions. There may be many 
cases like this as, at the outset of salvage or archaeological work, it may not be possible 
to make any other assumption than the proportions might be quite balanced. This could 
be because the discoverers of a wreck have only a very general idea as to its age, or 
origin. In this type of case, it would seem to be advisable to proceed with excavations 
slowly as if the wreck could yield significant archaeological value as well as salvage 
value. 
 
Admiralty law courts have begun to fashion rules rewarding salvagers' efforts to preserve 
archaeological data and artifacts. Thus, awards are larger for better work done in this 
regard. To illustrate, in 1996 the exclusive salvage rights to the Titanic were challenged 
in court. But the court held that "the preservation of the archaeological integrity of the 
wreck as well as the preservation of the retrieved artifacts was evidence that the operation 
had been undertaken with due diligence" (Christie et. al, 1999, page 160). 
 
Also, the salvagers of "The Nashville" where refused by a Federal District Court any 
salvage award because their handling of the property had increased the likelihood of the 
deterioration of the goods salvaged. In addition, in 1982 a Federal Court ruled that in 
order to state a claim for a salvage award on ancient vessels of archaeological value, it is 
an essential element that the salvager documents to the admiralty court's satisfaction that 
it has preserved the archaeological value of the wreck.   
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It is therefore apparent that US courts recognize the different values that may be 
contained by a shipwreck and that they have devised incentives for salvagers to gather 
archaeological data that they may well have otherwise destroyed.  
 
However, an important proviso concerns the type of archaeological data gathered by 
salvage companies. Is it of high archaeological value? There can be a vast difference 
between data gathered by non-specialist and specialist archaeologists. The latter most 
often will be concerned with gathering an interpreting data suitable for publication in 
peer-review archaeology journals. In other words, a specialist's archaeology can normally 
be expected to be of the highest quality. According to Robert Neyland, Chairman of the 
Advisory Council for Underwater Archaeology, no archaeological report written by a 
salvage company that he knows of has ever appeared in a peer-reviewed archaeology 
journal.4 For example, the salvagers of the Central America sunken in 1857, carrying 21 
tones of gold, and salvaged in 1987, were awarded 90% of the gold bullion and coins 
recovered even though no archaeological reports were published. 
 
Thus, if it is an objective of the courts to induce salvage companies to be concerned with 
preserving the archaeological record they are probably failing because salvage companies 
produce archaeological records of less than scientific standard. While it might be said that 
some record is better than no record, such a situation may be far from TNPV maximizing 
behavior. 
 
                                                          
4 Private letter to author dated November 18th, 2002. 
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One way to deal with this problem would be to require salvage companies to produce 
archaeological data suitable for processing into papers publishable in peer-review 
journals. This ought to induce the salvage companies to employ professional 
archaeologists devoted to collection of such data. Since such professionals would need to 
have some say as to the number of days needed for a dive, a move toward the TNPV 
maximizing number of dive days would be expected. In other words, the courts could 
introduce standards that in effect uses salvage companies as agents concerned with 
collecting high quality archaeological data. 
 
3: Developing international law on historic shipwrecks 
At the other extreme of the law of salvage as currently applied would be laws that 
promoted archaeological value over salvage value. Such a law if it were ever instituted 
could be based on the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization's 
Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage - adopted in 
November 2001. The Convention if ratified, and assuming that a country does not take a 
reservation (i.e. says that it will not be bound by the Convention), will apply outside its 
territorial waters, i.e. in its EEZ and contiguous continental shelf (as well as on the high 
seas beyond).  
 
The Convention heavily favors archaeological values and appears to discount salvage 
value completely. This is evident from the first two rules abstracted from the annex to the 
document concerning activities directed at underwater cultural heritage. "Rule 1. The 
protection of underwater cultural heritage through in situ preservation shall be considered 
 17
as the first option. Accordingly, activities directed at underwater cultural heritage shall be 
authorized in a manner consistent with the protection of that heritage, and subject to that 
requirement may be authorized for the purpose of making a significant contribution to 
protection or knowledge or enhancement of underwater cultural heritage. And "Rule 2. 
The commercial exploitation of underwater cultural heritage for trade or speculation or its 
irretrievable dispersal is fundamentally incompatible with the protection and proper 
management of underwater cultural heritage. Underwater cultural heritage shall not be 
traded, sold, bought or bartered as commercial goods" 
 
It is clear that this Convention favors archaeological value to the virtual exclusion of 
salvage value. The value of salvage in returning goods to the circulation of commerce 
(such circulation presumably being the original intent when the goods were first shipped) 
is entirely discounted. This would appear to be the meaning of the last sentence of 
paragraph 2: "Underwater cultural heritage shall not be traded, sold, bought or bartered 
as commercial goods". Rather, as the opening sentence of the quotation says "the 
protection of underwater cultural heritage through in situ preservation shall be 
considered as the first option". This seems to imply that the Convention would rather 
leave goods untouched on a wreck site than have them recovered. Such a policy is 
extreme to say the least given the very high salvage values that are possible. For example, 
the gold recovered from the steamship Central America, sunken in 1857 in 2,500 meters 
of water is valued at up to $400 million. 
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Given its apparently extreme nature in favoring archaeological over salvage value what 
kind of rational might explain the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater 
Cultural Heritage. There would seem to be two candidates. First, in any project appraisal 
the choice of discount rate may be crucial. Lower discount rates increase the PV of 
expected future benefits. If it is supposed that the utility of the archaeological knowledge 
once collected from a wreck does not decline over time, the use of a very low, or, even, 
zero discount rate could yield a high NPV for archaeological knowledge. In this scenario, 
with a high archaeological value, the TNPV function of figure 1 could be upward sloping 
throughout its length - so favoring archaeological value over salvage value.   
 
How credible is it that the countries voting for the Convention rationally and consistently 
favor a low discount rate in their resource allocation decisions? In fact, most of the 87 
countries voting for the Convention are low-income countries. (Most of the 19 countries 
either abstaining or voting against it are high-income countries) Given that low income is 
usually associated with higher rates of time preference (a determinant of the discount 
rate), and that these countries often have poor records of conserving their terrestrial 
environmental assets, a credible 'low discount rate' explanation for Rules 1 and 2 of the 
Convention is questionable. 
 
Secondly, the Convention is politically motivated and is aimed at promoting the interests 
of Third World countries even at the expense of developed countries. The general voting 
pattern of Third World largely 'for' and developed countries largely 'not for' the 
Convention is consistent with this interpretation. The Convention might therefore be seen 
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as a sort of holdover from the New International Economic Order motivation of the 1970s 
that was pressed by Third World countries to institute certain policies that would have 
favored them. For example, The NIEO promoted the idea of managing worldwide raw 
material trade aimed at stabilizing and raising the prices of certain raw materials exported 
by Third World countries. Relevant to this line of argument is the fact that the new 
underwater exploration technologies are the property of a few developed countries. Thus, 
it is these countries that perhaps stand to profit most from the commercial exploitation of 
shipwrecks lying outside of their territorial waters, rather than Third World countries as a 
whole. If this argument is correct then the Convention in promoting archaeological value 
over salvage value is a sort of beggar-thy-neighbor policy on the part of Third World 
countries - 'if we can't benefit neither shall you'. 
 
However, as both of these possible explanations for apparent bias of the Convention are 
themselves somewhat speculative, it remains an open question as to why it discounts 
salvage value so heavily. 
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FIGURE 1: THE VALUE OF AN HISTORIC SHIPWRECK 
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